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Abstract
This paper argues that Quaker business ethics can be understood as a MacIntyrean tradition. To do so, it draws on three 
key MacIntyrean concepts: community, compartmentalisation, and the critique of management. The emphasis in Quaker 
business ethics on finding unity, as well as the emphasis that Quaker businesses have placed on serving their local areas, 
accords with MacIntyre’s claim that small-scale community is essential to human flourishing. The emphasis on integrity in 
Quaker business ethics means practitioners are well-placed to resist the compartmentalising pressures of contemporary work. 
Quaker business ethics is also highly critical of the manipulative forms of management that MacIntyre regards as dominant. 
As such, Quaker business ethics provides evidence that more morally ameliorative forms of running business organisations 
is possible, even if they remain difficult to achieve.
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Introduction
In this paper we explore the Quaker tradition in business 
and business ethics. Other religious traditions have been 
the focus of recent work in business ethics, for instance 
Islam (Murphy and Smolarski 2020; Sidani and Al Ariss 
2015), Confucianism (Koehn 2001; Romar 2004), Buddhism 
(Gould 1995; Pace 2013), Hinduism (Poruthiyil 2020), and 
there is also a significant body of work on Catholicism in 
business ethics (e.g. Sison et al. 2016; Bernacchio 2019). 
While there has been some research on Quakerism in the 
business ethics literature, such as Wagner-Tsukamoto (2008) 
who draws on Quakerism as an example of behavioural busi-
ness ethics, we believe there is scope for a more detailed 
examination of Quaker business ethics that focuses on its 
philosophical and ethical commitments.
To do so, we draw attention to the overlap between 
Quaker business ethics and the thought of Alasdair 
MacIntyre, whose work has been cited more than any other 
virtue ethicist in the business ethics literature (Ferrero and 
Sison 2014), with After Virtue (2007) being the focus of 
most of this scholarly attention (Beadle 2017). While Quak-
ers share similar testimonies throughout the world, Quaker 
theology has varied interpretations. In this paper we assume 
a “Liberal Quaker” theology (Dandelion 2004), and focus 
in particular on UK Quakers. We highlight how Quaker-
ism fits within MacIntyre’s conception of traditions, and 
then explore three aspects of MacIntyre’s thought that are 
especially relevant to Quaker business ethics: community, 
compartmentalisation, and the critique of manipulative man-
agement. These aspects reflect both the individual and social 
characteristics of Quakerism, and the rejection of the sacred/
secular binary that urges Quakers to “Bring the whole of 
your life under the ordering of the spirit of Christ… Let your 
worship and your daily life enrich each other” (Quakers in 
Britain 1995, 1.02).
In terms of community, the emphasis on discernment 
and finding unity, and the emphasis Quaker businesses have 
placed on serving their communities, accords with Mac-
Intyre’s claim that small-scale and egalitarian community 
is essential to the achievement of human flourishing. Sec-
ond, according to MacIntyre, contemporary culture creates 
a pressure to compartmentalise our lives between various 
roles, which is turn undermines our moral agency as we 
become unable to adjudicate between competing demands. 
 * Matthew Sinnicks 
 matthew.sinnicks@york.ac.uk
 Nicholas Burton 
 n.burton@nortumbria.ac.uk
1 Northumbria University, City Campus East 1, 
Newcastle NE1 8ST, UK
2 The York Management School, University of York, Freboys 
Lane, York YO10 5GD, UK
 N. Burton, M. Sinnicks 
1 3
The emphasis on integrity, and the continuity between spir-
itual and worldly life in Quaker business ethics means prac-
titioners are well-placed to resist the compartmentalising 
pressures of contemporary work, even though they are not 
entirely immune to them. Finally, Quaker business ethics 
is also highly critical of the manipulative forms of man-
agement that MacIntyre regards as dominant, and Quaker 
business practice also provides evidence that more morally 
ameliorative forms of running business organisations are 
possible even if they remain difficult to achieve. Research 
which draws on MacIntyre and seeks to connect religion 
and business ethics has, in line with MacIntyre’s own reli-
gious convictions, focussed primarily on Catholicism (e.g. 
Moore et al. 2014; Velasquez and Brady 1997; McCann and 
Brownsberger 1990). Following Chu and Moore’s (2020) 
connection of MacIntyre’s thought to the Confucian tradi-
tion, we connect it to Quakerism, and thus hope to add to the 
diversity of voices in the conversation about business ethics, 
religion, and virtue.
The Quaker Tradition
Quakers played a central role in the development of a vari-
ety of industries in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
with perhaps the best-known examples being banking and 
confectionary (e.g. Emden 1940; King 2014; Raistrick 1951; 
Windsor 1980; Walvin 1997). There are a number of rea-
sons why Quakers were disproportionately associated with 
successful businesses during this period, although the eth-
ics of Quakers businesses has attracted a few critical voices 
(e.g. Rowlinson 1988, 1995; Rowlinson and Hassard 1993; 
Sahle 2018). Nonetheless, Quakers are often associated with 
a reputation for honesty and integrity and their business ven-
tures were often established with socio-economic ambitions 
(Burton et al. 2019), drawing upon religious principles and 
ethics (Fincham 2017). Quakers were well-known for their 
hard work which was successfully leveraged through strong 
bonds of kinship, dense industrial networks of co-religionists 
(Burton and Turnbull 2019) and continuous innovation in 
organisation and management (Maclean et al. 2020). In this 
section we attempt to place Quaker business ethics within 
MacIntyre’s broad concept of traditions before going on to 
suggest that there is an important affinity between Quaker 
business ethics and MacIntyre’s own preferred tradition of 
ethical thought in the following sections.
According to MacIntyre, a tradition is.
an argument extended through time in which certain 
fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in 
terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and 
enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at 
least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and 
those internal, interpretative debates through which the 
meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements 
come to be expressed and whose progress a tradition 
is constituted (MacIntyre 1988, p. 12).
This contrasts both with a conception of inquiry that seeks 
some tradition-transcendent Archimedean point, and with a 
more general relativistic scepticism about truth—positions 
MacIntyre characterises as ‘Encyclopaedia’ and ‘Genealogy’ 
respectively (MacIntyre 1990). We must always begin from a 
highly particular set of premises and assumptions, and with 
a particular understanding of how to proceed intellectually. 
As such, MacIntyre defends.
a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tra-
dition, a conception according to which the standards 
of rational justification themselves emerge from and 
are part of a history in which they are vindicated by 
the way in which they transcend the limitations of and 
provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors 
within the history of that same tradition (MacIntyre 
1988, p. 7).
While some have seen in this conception of rational enquiry 
a defence of relativism (a charge rebutted by Lutz 2004, 
Kuna 2005, and Seipel 2015), the ramifications, in the con-
text of organisational research and business ethics, is that the 
“traditional approach to enquiry holds to a notion of truth 
that seeks neither the timelessness of law-like generaliza-
tions nor the dissolution of categories through which enquiry 
is undertaken” (Beadle and Moore 2006, p. 326).
This conception of rational enquiry thus has an important 
affinity with the Quaker notion of ‘experimental’ knowing. 
According to this concept, claims to knowledge are based 
on experience that arises from right action, and they serve 
in turn as the basis for further ‘experiments’ (Muers 2015, p. 
15) and thus form part of a continuing process, and indeed a 
continuing tradition. This also accords with the notion that 
the spiritual journey of the Quaker is continuous, and unend-
ing, just as MacIntyre describes “the good life for man is the 
life spent in seeking for the good life for man” (MacIntyre 
2007, p. 219. See also Moore 2005, pp. 245–247).
This conception of a spiritual journey arises in part from 
Quaker discernment, a notion with connotations of spiritual 
clarity (Miller 2020), rather than intellectual judgement 
(Miller 2020), and thus is one of the distinctive epistemic 
features of the Quaker tradition. Its centrality to Quakerism 
means that it is key to understanding Quaker ethics and busi-
ness practice. Discernment is grounded in the idea of the 
Light Within implanted by God in every person and a readi-
ness to answer that of God in another (Dandelion 2004). 
Quakers widely reject the sacred/secular binary, have no 
priesthood or other formalised hierarchy, and Quakers afford 
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primacy to the personal and social experience, rather than 
creed or scripture; for Quakers, knowing truth and living 
truth are inseparable (Muers and Burton 2019). It proceeds 
with a process of ‘centring down’, an entry into silence and 
inward reflection that encourages community connection. 
Periods of silence and spoken contributions are interwoven 
as individuals open up their own individual knowledge and 
beliefs to others in the group and self-reflexively examine 
their own judgement in light of the contribution of others 
with an aim to foster a wider group-wisdom and collective 
unity. It is interesting to observe that Quakers embed the 
virtue of humility in the idea “Think it possible you may be 
mistaken” (Quakers in Britain 1995, 13.10) in order to effect 
a qualitative change in individual beliefs and knowledge, 
and a willingness to sense the emerging unity of the group 
(Anderson 2006). Quaker discernment, therefore, recognizes 
that members of a group have “different experience, dif-
ferent kinds of knowledge” (Ambler 2013, p. 69) that help 
shape individual knowledge and belief into a collective unity 
that reflects the ‘sense of the meeting’ (Allen 2017). The 
continuous and evolving cycle of discernment and social 
action to which Muers refers shows how Quakers eschew 
epistemic closure and engage in morally reflexive cycles of 
discernment and social action that come to reflect a con-
stantly evolving tradition (Vu and Burton 2020).
Like other religious traditions, Quakerism is character-
ised by a distinctive set of ethical and moral concerns. In 
the Quaker tradition, these are embedded in the Quaker tes-
timonies to peace, truth, integrity, simplicity, and equality 
(Quakers in Britain 1995). Revised once every generation, 
the Quaker testimonies represent “storied and shared tradi-
tions of practice” (Burton et al. 2018, p. 360) that interact 
with discernment in multiple ways. For example, Quaker 
testimonies shape how Quakers discern between right and 
wrong action, and yet the testimonies are guided and shaped 
by continuing discernment across both time and space as an 
evolving process—what Quakers call continuing revelation 
(Anderson 2007).
This reveals the distinctive epistemic standards of the 
Quaker tradition. MacIntyre says “all reasoning takes place 
within the context of some traditional mode of thought, 
transcending through criticism and invention the limita-
tions of what had hitherto been reasoned in that tradition” 
(MacIntyre 2007, p. 222), but another distinctive feature of 
the Quaker tradition is that it departs from this more adver-
sarial model of intellectual and spiritual progress. While 
the basic features of a tradition are present, and indeed are 
hard to depart from entirely (see Lutz 2004, p. 56), Quaker-
ism seems, in part, to be defined as a tradition that seeks to 
emphasise unity as well as the worthiness and equality of 
all contributions. While there is a great degree of plurality 
in Quaker thought (for a discussion, see Dandelion 2004, 
2008), there is nevertheless a distinction between Quaker 
practices and practices which would not fit with the precepts 
and values of Quakerism. Dandelion (2004) has called this 
the behavioural creed of Quaker practice. Moreover, Quak-
ers’ emphasis on unity is only explicable in the context of a 
separation from contrasting practices in both business and 
theology. By positioning itself in a way that emphasises 
unity, Quakerism tacitly critiques the adversarial approaches 
of other traditions in a way that could not be voiced in terms 
of philosophical objections in a debate between opponents 
i.e. in the manner that MacIntyre regards as central to the 
debates between rival traditions. Thus, we continue to see 
epistemic humility as a central virtue of the Quaker tradition.
This humility is reflected in the recognition that a 
Quaker’s spiritual journey, which discernment encour-
ages, is never complete and so is unending. Rather, Quakers 
acknowledge that self-transformation is an ethically salient 
process, itself valuable and inseparable from its desired out-
come. The silence that frames Quaker discernment enables 
communication “with God and the ‘self’” (Fennell 2012, p. 
555), is the starting point of this process, and encourages a 
reconstructed “personhood” (Smolenski 1999) that is itself 
open to further transformations in the future. This journey is 
a shared journey. As MacIntyre says of traditions, “whoever 
we are, we can only begin enquiry from the vantage point 
afforded by our relationship to some specific social and intel-
lectual past through which we have affiliated ourselves to 
some particular tradition of enquiry, extending the history of 
that enquiry into the present” (MacIntyre 1988, p. 401). This 
connects to the emphasis in Quakerism of the importance 
of discernment, of reaching a shared understanding of the 
sense of the meeting, and thus to the concept of community, 
which is the topic of the following section.
These Quaker practices have given rise to a distinctive 
method in business. While discernment emphasises unity, 
it is nevertheless difficult to adequately make sense of it 
outside of the theological context of the Quaker tradition 
(Muers and Burton 2019). Hence it is not feasible to simply 
amalgamate Quaker discernment with practices from other 
traditions even where there are important similarities, such 
as in the case of Buddhism (Vu and Burton 2020). In line 
with MacIntyre’s understanding of traditions, an attempt to 
take a ‘pick and mix’ of practices outside the wider tradi-
tional context is to be apt to misunderstand, and thus misap-
ply, them.
There are any number of traditions in the broad sense. 
Buddhism, Marxism, and even Liberalism, despite its 
self-understanding as neutral and a-traditional, are to be 
accounted traditions in this sense. However, there is also a 
more exclusive sense of ‘tradition’ that marks out the Thom-
istic-Aristotelian tradition, to which MacIntyre’s own mature 
work is a contribution. This is the Tradition that is contrasted 
with Genealogy and Encyclopaedia in Three Rival Versions 
of Moral Enquiry (MacIntyre 1990), and includes Plato, 
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Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas among its central con-
tributors. While Quakerism is clearly a tradition is the broad 
categorical sense, it also can be understood as neighbouring 
this distinctly MacIntyrean tradition (a term we prefer due 
to the differences between Thomism and Quaker theology). 
This ethical proximity is particularly evident when we exam-
ine the affinities between Quaker business ethics and Mac-
Intyrean business ethics. In what follows, we explore three 
key areas where this similarity is most evident, beginning 
with the concept of community.
Community
The concept of community is an essential feature of Mac-
Intyre’s work, and indeed many applications of his work 
in the business ethics literature have focussed on account-
ing some occupation a kind of practice-based community. 
While there has been much written on MacIntyre’s concept 
of a practice, both within the business ethics literature (e.g. 
Moore 2002; Moore and Beadle 2006; Sinnicks 2019), and 
without (e.g. Miller 1984; Knight 2008; Hager 2011), in this 
section we focus on the broader conception of community 
itself, as we are concerned with the more general question of 
Quaker business ethics as a mode of engagement, than with 
the nature of particular forms of work.
In recent times, Quakers have directed their efforts 
towards such goods as peacebuilding, humanitarian work, 
and economic reform (Muers 2015), building upon the tradi-
tion of Quakers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries who discerned a pressing social purpose for business. 
Thus, the Quaker business tradition builds on a wider vision 
than that of simply achieving business success. Indeed, this 
wider ethical vision is expressed in the way Quaker busi-
nesses have typically sought to serve wider communities, 
such as “their workers, factories, towns and cities” (Turnbull 
2014, p. 60).
As we have noted, Quaker business practice is grounded 
in the idea of the Light Within implanted by God in every 
person and a readiness to answer that of God in another 
(Dandelion 2004). This reflects a commitment to equality 
that is also manifest in, among other things, an acceptance 
of the equality of voices in discernment. As Quakers have no 
formal hierarchy, discernment is not led by any one person 
by virtue of their power or position. Rather, Quakers nomi-
nate a clerk, for a period of no more than three years, whose 
role is to stand outside the discernment process in order to 
more-effectively sense the emerging unity and capture that 
sense contemporaneously in a minute (the action agreed by 
those present). Thus, the clerk has no formal power as tradi-
tionally understood, but rather acts as a servant of the meet-
ing (see Beaver 2014; Crippen 2011; Greenleaf et al. 1996 
for Quaker roots in servant leadership).
This accords with MacIntyre’s claim that “insofar as 
human beings have the capacity to become good, they 
also have the capacity to exercise the prudence of a 
ruler” (MacIntyre 1996, p. 68). This insight helps with 
an account of business ethics that draws on MacIntyre to 
remain wary of undue deference to those who occupy posi-
tions of power (Sinnicks 2020a), an insight which has clear 
affinities with Quaker thought. While Quaker theology is 
varied (Dandelion 2014), at its heart is the notion that each 
one of us has a Light within (Rediehs 2016). Indeed, this 
openness to the fundamental equality of all humanity is 
partly why Quaker theology is so varied. MacIntyre notes 
that “a plain person who begins to understand her or his 
life as an uneven progress towards the achievement of her 
or his good is thus to some significant extent transformed 
into a moral philosopher” (MacIntyre 1992 p. 4). There 
is nothing categorically distinct or uniquely authoritative 
about the pronouncements of moral philosophy as a pro-
fessionalised activity, a suspicion which finds a parallel 
in Quakerism’s lack of a distinct priesthood, but rather a 
reflectiveness about and concern with the various goods 
required to flourish, ethically and spiritually, are important 
and available to all.
This egalitarian ethos is at odds with any perspective 
which affords authority to any individual or set of indi-
viduals, and again finds a parallel in MacIntyre’s thought. 
According to MacIntyre “those who arrogate to themselves 
an exclusive, professionalised authority of a certain kind 
by that very act of arrogation discredit their own claims to 
legitimate authority” (MacIntyre 1996, p. 70). Here again 
we see grounds for a commitment to the epistemic humil-
ity we noted above was a feature of the Quaker tradition. 
These egalitarian and communal commitments have ramifi-
cations for Quaker business ethics. The practice of Quaker 
discernment offers opportunities for groups and teams to 
make responsible decisions within the workplace that attend 
to the ethical and/or spiritual values guiding the group. The 
practice of discernment encourages decisions which are 
“respectful, non-hierarchal, and ego-constrained manner, 
aiming to achieve unity around the way forward” (Vu and 
Burton 2020, p. 220). This again has important affinities 
with MacIntyre’s conception of community.
Sinnicks (2014) suggests that MacIntyre’s political 
thought is key to any successful attempt to apply MacIn-
tyre to business ethics, and Bernacchio (2018) focuses on 
inter-organisational networks in a way that emphasises a 
shared sense of community which underpins the Aristote-
lian conception of politics. In this vein, MacIntyre specifies 
certain necessary conditions for a political or social institu-
tion to be conducive to the achievement of individual and 
common goods. He says: “They must afford expression to 
the political decision-making of independent reasoners on 
all those matters on which it is important that the members 
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of a particular community be able to come through shared 
rational deliberation to a common mind” (MacIntyre 1999a, 
p. 129). This notion of shared decision-making has been 
drawn on in MacIntyrean business ethics (e.g. Bernacchio 
and Couch 2015) and, as we have noted, is a central feature 
of Quaker business ethics.
However, for Quaker business ethics, not just any form 
of shared decision-making will suffice. Quaker discernment 
is fundamentally different to reaching consensus (Anderson 
2006). Rather than horse-trading or effecting a quantitative 
change in the beliefs of a group, reaching unity through dis-
cernment requires a qualitative change in individual beliefs 
and knowledge, and a willingness to sense the emerging 
unity even if that unity does not accord with an individually-
held opinion or belief. Burton (2017) has described this type 
of discernment as the ‘Quaker Business Method’ (see also 
Bradney and Cownie 2000; Reis-Louis 1994). This method 
embeds Quaker theology, and reflects a distinctively collabo-
rative approach to recognise that everyone is equally capable 
of contributing to the decision at hand. One of the notable 
features of Quaker discernment, therefore, is the absence of 
voting, which ostensibly is a marker of shared decision-mak-
ing. Again, MacIntyre’s reflections on politics can inform us 
as to why voting is not necessarily an indicator of adequate, 
communal decision-making. MacIntyre critiques contem-
porary society as being characterised by irresolvable ethical 
conflicts that leads to moral discourage becoming increas-
ingly shrill (see MacIntyre 2007, especially chap. 1), and 
this means that contemporary political elections amounting 
to little more than the summing of untutored—or worse, 
artificial and manipulated—preferences, rather than a reflec-
tion of rational persuasion or shared deliberation. For Mac-
Intyre, communities “must afford expression to the political 
decision-making of independent reasoners on all those mat-
ters on which it is important that the members of a par-
ticular community be able to come through shared rational 
deliberation to a common mind” (MacIntyre 1999a, p. 129). 
Likewise, Quakers seek to involve everyone, but in line with 
an opposition to adversarial or agonistic approaches as we 
noted above. Thus, the Quaker approach is characterised 
by an absence of confrontational debate and indeed of any 
method that emphasises differences of opinion. Instead, the 
Quaker method relies on a deliberate search for unity. Differ-
ences of opinion do, however, sometimes occur, and Quakers 
are adept at reflexively looking inward to understand and 
resolve difference and conflict. Where unity is not reached, 
this is not seen as ‘failure’, but rather that God’s will could 
not be discerned at that time, and participants are invited 
to ‘wait’ and reconvene after a period of inward reflection.
Despite the absence of confrontation, discernment, how-
ever, cannot be described as sterile or conservative. Indeed, 
Quakers are called to ‘Live Adventurously’ and be prepared 
for discernment to open up new and unexpected insights 
(Quakers in Britain 1995, 1.02). For example, Muers and 
Burton (2019) noted how, in 2009, Quakers approved the 
solemnisation of marriages for same-sex couples (before 
this was legal in the UK) highlighting the rapid movement 
from controversy to unity. In business, Quaker firms in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century discerned the need for 
business to attend to social disadvantage and injustice and 
provided employee welfare benefits, pension schemes, and 
subsidised housing for employees (e.g. Walvin 1997) at a 
time when these kinds of social initiatives were uncommon.
In fact, many Quaker and Quaker-connected organisa-
tions continue to embed discernment as an explicit approach 
to decision-making in their constitution. For example, the 
Scott Bader Commonwealth—a medium-sized, international 
chemical manufacturing company—was established by a 
Quaker family in 1921 as a limited company, and converted 
to employee ownership in 1951 as a commonwealth. Today, 
its constitution continues to refer to “decision-making by 
unity…rather than a formal vote” (Scott Bader Common-
wealth, 2010, p. 27). Further, in the charity sector the Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust describes its decision-making as 
“based on Quaker values…each Trust meeting starts and 
ends with a period of silent worship. We don’t vote—we try 
to listen to each other and to God, so that we are guided to 
the right decision” (JRCT, n.d.).
It should be recognised, however, that ensuring all voices 
are heard in decision-making is especially challenging in 
business contexts, and not all Quaker businesses embedded 
the ‘voice of labour’. For example, in the first-half of the 
twentieth century, Quaker firms held four Quaker Employer 
Conferences to discuss issues of the day including the voice 
and claims of labour, and which were followed by The 
Rowntree Lecture Series that bought together employers and 
employees from different levels of an organisations’ hierar-
chy to confront pressing issues in British industry (Maclean 
et al. 2020). However, while Quaker firms embraced issues 
such as trade union membership, profit-sharing, and works’ 
councils (Child 1964; Kimberley 2019), the voice of labour 
was often heard on the Quaker firms’ own terms, and co-
operative and common forms of ownership that widely 
shared power and decision-making were often dismissed or 
resisted due to concerns over future profitability of the enter-
prises. As Maclean et al. (2020, p. 11) noted, it is possible 
that Quakerism reinforced “a particular form of capitalism” 
that encouraged “employee compliance with managerial 
authority…through the validation of a managerial elite as 
the rightful guardians of administrative control if it could 
prove itself sufficiently humanist and caring of its workers” 
(Maclean et al. 2020, pp. 11–15).
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Compartmentalisation
According to MacIntyre, “The characteristic modern self 
is in various and varying ways a divided self” (MacIntyre 
2008 p. 267). This division is a result of various pressures to 
compartmentalise the various roles we occupy. The effect of 
this compartmentalisation is that individuals focus only on 
particular roles at particular times, never achieving a role-
transcendent perspective that would allow them to better 
order their concerns and priorities. Because of this com-
partmentalisation “there is a lessening of inner conflict, but 
at the cost of a lack of self-awareness. And this lack of self-
awareness obscures the underlying unity of the divided self” 
(ibid). In other words, compartmentalisation reduces inner 
conflict because it makes the underlying incompatibility of 
values that inform our different roles invisible. Thus, we 
experience our different roles as if there were no conflict 
between them, when in fact there may well be deep, perhaps 
irresolvable, conflicts that remain necessarily hidden from 
view.
This compartmentalisation is especially likely to arise in 
the context of work, where there is a greater incentive to 
separate one’s personal concerns and convictions from the 
values presupposed by or latent in one’s occupational role. 
When describing Goodpaster and Sayre’s (1977) study of the 
commitments of power company executives, MacIntyre says,
One incidental discovery… was that power company 
executives tended to a significant degree to answer 
what were substantially the same questions somewhat 
differently, depending on whether they took them-
selves to be responding qua power company executive 
or qua parent and head of household or qua concerned 
citizen. That is to say, their attitudes varied with their 
social roles and they seemed quite unaware of this 
(MacIntyre 1999b, pp. 321–322).
What this shows is that people are liable to meet the 
demands of the role they happen to play and where they 
have no standpoint from which to assess their whole lives, 
such contradictions may pass unnoticed. This compart-
mentalisation is ethically troubling in at least three related 
ways. Firstly, the inability to adjudicate between competing 
demands leaves one liable to prioritise a relatively trivial 
ethical demand, such as those to do with workplace perfor-
mance, for instance, over more important demands such as 
those of being a good parent or citizen, for instance.
Secondly, it can undermine the development of virtues by 
allowing only for the development of context-specific skills. 
As MacIntyre says,
What are spoken of as the virtues of a good committee 
man or of a good gambler or a pool hustler are pro-
fessional skills professionally deployed in those situa-
tions where they can be effective, not virtues. Someone 
who genuinely possesses a virtue can be expected to 
manifest it in very different types of situation, many of 
them situations where the practice of a virtue cannot 
be expected to be effective in the way we can expect a 
professional skill to be (MacIntyre 2007, p. 205).
If the different types of situation we face are compartmen-
talised from each other, this cross-context application of the 
virtues becomes both intrinsically more difficult, and makes 
an education in the virtues less likely, as we become unable 
to ask ourselves whether we have been truly honest or truly 
kind if we are unable to transcend compartmentalised roles. 
Because “virtues, unlike skills, direct us only to good ends” 
(MacIntyre 2006, p. 117) this is a matter of serious concern 
as it again makes it harder for us to discern which ends are 
worthwhile.
Thirdly, it undermines the development of the key virtues 
of integrity and constancy in particular. The divided self, 
according to MacIntyre,
cannot have integrity, just because its allegiance to 
this or that set of standards is always temporary and 
context-bound. And it cannot have the constancy that 
is expressed in an unwavering directedness, since it 
recurrently changes direction, as it moves from sphere 
to sphere. Indeed its conception of a virtue will gener-
ally be one of excellence in role performance rather 
than of excellence as a human being and hence what 
is judged excellent in one role-governed context may 
be very different from and even sometimes incompat-
ible with what is judged excellent in others (MacIntyre 
1999b, pp. 324–325).
Thus, there is a special importance attached to maintain-
ing a unity of concerns and commitments across different 
domains. This is reflected in the Quaker view that the dichot-
omy between the sacred and the secular is false. Instead, 
they see the divine as being present in both ‘worldly’ and 
‘religious’ activity. This finds a parallel in MacIntyre’s 
reflections on work. MacIntyre suggests that “there is a 
close connection between being a good human being and 
doing good work”, a connection which “has been lost sight 
of altogether in the contemporary workplace” (MacIntyre 
2011, p. 323). Here MacIntyre also says that when in good 
order work should be “thought of as a kind of prayer and 
performed as an act of prayer” (ibid). Echoing this view, 
Delbecq et al. (2004) remarked that ‘mundane’ activities—
such as work—are always imbued with spiritual significance 
in carrying out God’s work.
Not everyone is perhaps lucky enough to be employed in 
an organisation that adopts Quaker commitments to equality 
and unity, and so Quakers may find themselves just as sub-
ject to the pressures to compartmentalise as non-Quakers. 
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Furthermore, Quakers are not infallible, and so may not 
always be able to resist this compartmentalisation, and so 
are not immune to the moral dissonance that compartmen-
talization can create for individuals in business and profes-
sional life (Burton and Vu 2020). Nevertheless, despite not 
being impervious to these pressures, the Quaker tradition is 
well-placed to both recognise them as problematic, and to 
resist them. For Quakers, the continuity of inner and outer 
life is deeply important, and the commitment to integrity can 
act as a safeguard against the kind of radical compartmen-
talisation that MacIntyre diagnoses as a central affliction of 
modernity. Raistrick, for example, commented that “their 
refusal to separate business activities from the principles and 
disciplines which regulated their religious life, gave them a 
stability and soundness of practice that was unusual in their 
day” (Raistrick 1951, p. 46).
Over history, a number of scholars have shown how 
Quakers, sometimes at high personal cost, have sought to 
resist compartmentalization. For example, early Quaker 
history has many examples of prominent Quaker business-
people being jailed for refusing to swear an oath or remove 
a hat in court, signalling an unwavering commitment to 
Truth and Equality in all circumstances. Lloyd (2013), for 
example, narrated how the members of the Lloyds family 
(of the banking dynasty) were jailed for refusing to swear an 
oath, despite their significant business interests. Further, as 
Quaker enterprises grew and expanded, many Quaker firms 
needed external expertise unavailable within the community 
and invited non-Quakers to join the board. As this process 
continued, Quaker representation on the board diminished 
until they eventually lost control of and resigned from the 
businesses they had created e.g. Huntley and Palmer (Burton 
et al. 2019), Albright and Wilson (Sleapwood 2019) and 
Friends Provident (Tregoning and Cockerell 1982). In a sim-
ilar way, as many Quaker businesses grew, the second, third 
and subsequent generations of Quaker families were often 
seduced by wealth from their parents’ and grandparents’ 
business ventures and often renounced Quakerism in order 
to pursue less ‘plain’ lives. Clearly Quakers are not immune 
to the corrupting power of what MacIntyre calls “external 
goods” (MacIntyre 2007, p. 190). As Burton et al. (2019) 
remarked in their case analysis of Huntley and Palmer, even-
tually there were too few second and third generation Quak-
ers left to run the firms.
Critique of Manipulative Management
The final feature of MacIntyre’s thought that we consider 
here is his critique of manipulative management. While 
compartmentalisation is a widespread danger in the con-
temporary workplace, it is especially likely to arise for 
the manager, according to MacIntyre. This is because the 
manager is such a “dominant figure on the contemporary 
scene” (MacIntyre 2007, p. 74) and represents a distinctive 
and aspirational model. MacIntyre refers to the manager as 
a distinctive ‘character’ in the drama of contemporary life. 
These characters “are a very special type of social role which 
places a certain kind of moral constraint on the personality 
of those who inhabit them in a way in which many other 
social roles do not” (MacIntyre 2007, p. 27), and thus the 
occupant of the managerial role is under a greater degree 
of pressure to compartmentalise than are members of other 
occupations. What is especially distinctive about the ‘char-
acter’ of the manager, according to MacIntyre, is the way 
its reliance on instrumental rationality inevitably leads it to 
become manipulative. As MacIntyre puts it, the manager.
represents in his character the obliteration of the dis-
tinction between manipulative and non-manipulative 
social relations… The manager treats ends as given, as 
outside his scope; his concern is with technique, with 
effectiveness in transforming raw materials into final 
products, unskilled labor into skilled labor, investment 
into profits (MacIntyre 2007, p. 30).
In this way, management is an embodiment of emotivism, 
sometimes known as the ‘boo-hurrah’ theory of morality. 
Emotivism regards expressions of moral judgements as 
mere expressions of preference. As such, emotivism is a 
doctrine which “entails the obliteration of any genuine dis-
tinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social 
relations…others are always means, never ends” (MacIn-
tyre 2007, pp. 23–24). Because moral judgements are mere 
expressions of preference, they cannot properly be part of 
any attempt to rationally persuade. They can, nevertheless, 
be used in attempts to change the views and actions of others 
but, in light of this non-rational nature, such attempts, where 
successful, are typically examples of manipulation.
This conception of value judgements, and the fact that 
ends are beyond the scope of managerial decision-making, 
leads to a fundamental distinction between those qualified to 
manage an organisation or rule a polity, and those managed 
or ruled, and thus falls foul of MacIntyre’s political thought 
we touched on above. As Knight puts it.
To divide society between the knowing and the known, 
the managers and the managed, is to demoralize eve-
ryone. It is to deny the managed the agency that is 
necessary to engage in the social activity of changing 
from how one is to how one ought to be, and it is to 
exempt managers from any need for such improvement 
(Knight 2017, p. 82).
Those who have drawn on MacIntyre’s work in busi-
ness ethics typically hold that MacIntyre misrepresents 
the nature of management. Moore (2008), for example, 
attempts to use MacIntyre’s arguments against him to 
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present a more ethically affirmative conception of man-
agement. Moore (2017) also outlines a variety of char-
acteristics of good management (pp. 110–114) and good 
organisations (pp. 124–130). MacIntyre restricts his cri-
tique to rational, bureaucratic management, perhaps due 
to its cultural dominance in the period leading up to the 
publication of After Virtue in 1981, and so perhaps ignores 
more ethically ameliorative forms of management. How-
ever, the charge of manipulativeness can be applied to var-
ious other models of management, and even to leadership, 
including value-laden forms such as charismatic and trans-
formational leadership (Sinnicks 2018). So, while MacIn-
tyre’s work has had a significant impact in business ethics, 
there is some truth to the charge that his work has been 
misappropriated by those with more favourable views of 
contemporary capitalism and the modern workplace (Bea-
dle 2002). In any case, our concern in the remainder of 
this section is to argue that Quaker business ethics shares 
MacIntyre’s ethical opposition to narrow self-interest and 
acquisitiveness, as well as to this critique of emotivistic 
and manipulative management.
For sure, the Quaker approach to business ethics in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a different 
social, political, and economic context, and so it may be 
unwise to draw lessons about particular practices and poli-
cies too readily. Indeed, there are examples of unethical or, 
at the very least, surprising practices that it is important 
to recount. For example, Wagner-Tsukamoto (2008) argued 
that most of the welfare advances in Quaker firms were only 
introduced once they had been ‘tested’ by Quaker employers 
in economic terms and if economic benefits did not exist, 
welfare programmes were abandoned. Rowlinson (1988) 
noted the implementation of a form of scientific manage-
ment at Cadbury’s in the early twentieth century, and argued 
that this could hardly be characterised as an embodiment 
of Quaker values. Corley (1972) noted likewise at Huntley 
and Palmer. Later, Rowlinson and Hassard (1993) described 
Cadbury’s corporate culture as “invented”. Through their 
purchase of cocoa in the West Indies, Rowntrees had links 
to slavery and indentured labour (Fitzgerald 1995; Robert-
son 2009). Finally, Smith (1967) recounts an example of the 
Galton family in Birmingham engaged in making guns and 
armaments. Such practices are at odds with wider Quaker 
commitments.
Nevertheless, the broader set of values that underpinned 
Quaker business in this period remains instructive. For 
Quakers, work was not simply a matter of wealth crea-
tion. Rather, wealth creation assumed a moral significance 
(Walvin 1997) that showed “truth to the world” (Raistrick 
1951, p. 46). Many Quakers recognised the link between 
business profitability and the ability to provide employee 
welfare. This is connected to ideals of service to society 
that animate recent applications of MacIntyre’s thought 
to finance (see, for instance, Sison et  al. 2019; Rocchi 
et al. 2021), as well as the notion of stewardship that Potts 
(2020) argues is central to good management. Although 
Quaker businesses have since been accused of paternalism 
(e.g. Turnbull 2014), they belonged to a social tradition 
of industrial philanthropy which included industrialists of 
many faiths (and none) in the Victorian era who regarded its 
employees as part of an extended family. This conception is 
deeply at odds with an approach to management that treats 
employees merely as means to the pre-set end of profit.
There are a number of examples from Quaker business 
practice during this period that illustrate such a concern with 
employee and community welfare. Joseph Rowntree devel-
oped a Works Magazine and Works library in 1902. Cad-
bury’s developed a sick club to care for, and provide wages 
to, staff who were ill and unable to work. Many Quaker 
employers introduced works councils, profit share schemes, 
free dental care, and half-day and bank holidays (Burton 
and Hope 2018; Bradley 1987). Notably, both the Rown-
tree and Cadbury families provided a pension scheme just 
after the turn of the twentieth century (Walvin 1997), and 
the Quaker model villages at Bourneville, Birmingham, and 
New Earswick, York, are perhaps the best-known expression 
of their social vision. These initiatives suggest that Quaker 
businesses recognised the worth of workers beyond their 
contributions considered in narrow economic terms, and 
mirror Bernacchio’s (2020) suggestion that the MacIntyrean 
perspective can ground a case for employee rights. Return-
ing to the example of the Scott Bader Commonwealth, these 
kinds of these kinds of social concern that were initially 
exemplified by its Quaker founder continue to manifest in 
strong commitments to employee ownership and charitable 
aims (Scott Bader Commonwealth, n.d.)
Quakers also recognised a sense of their responsibilities 
to a wider vision for community and society, responsibilities 
which would beyond the scope of the emotivist character 
of the manager. Many prominent Quaker industrialists held 
roles in their local cities and communities. For example, 
Turnbull (2014) recounts how Richard Capper Cadbury and 
John Cadbury served as Overseers of the Poor in Birming-
ham. John Cadbury was also chairman of the Markets and 
Fairs Committee and a governor of Birmingham General 
Hospital. The Cadburys and Rowntrees were also closely 
involved in education and social justice. For example, Joseph 
Rowntree remains well-known for establishing a Quaker 
school in York and the creation of the New Earswick model 
village on the city outskirts, and the Joseph Rowntree trusts 
continue to use their foundation to advance social aims to 
this day (e.g. Freeman 2003; Davies and Freeman 2005).
We noted above that Quakers place a high value on equal-
ity and unity. Such goods are incompatible with the concep-
tion of management that MacIntyre targets with his critique. 
Moreover, the practice of discernment, perhaps the key 
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feature of a distinctly Quaker business practice, is incom-
patible with regarding others as mere cogs in the machine of 
the business organisation. As such, Quaker business ethics is 
incompatible with the kind of manipulative social relations 
that MacIntyre regards, rightly or wrongly, as endemic in 
contemporary capitalism.
Today, few Quaker-owned businesses remain, and the rea-
sons for this are complex. While Quaker businesses, on the 
whole, were largely successful, how they came to disappear 
from the business landscape deserves comment. Wagner-
Tsukamoto (2008) suggests that the Quaker business eth-
ics ignored the market and that the market selected against 
them. Perhaps this assertion is too simplistic, though it is 
possible that it was advantageous to draw on the manipula-
tive, emotivistic managerial approaches MacIntyre criticised 
at that time, which put the more ethical approaches adopted 
by Quakers at a disadvantage. Cadbury (2010) suggests that 
the emergence of the UK welfare state in the first-half of the 
twentieth century reduced the need for a charitable Quaker 
business. Burton et al. (2019) argue that the change from 
family partnerships to the shareholder economy in the sec-
ond-half of the nineteenth century resulted in a weakening 
of Quaker firms’ social ambitions as non-Quakers came to 
occupy prominent managerial positions as a consequence of 
mergers, acquisitions and other market mechanisms. Mac-
Intyre’s claim that the modern economic order “provides 
systematic incentives to develop a type of character that has 
a propensity to injustice” (MacIntyre 1995, p. xiv) suggests 
that it will be difficult for any ethical tradition to emerge 
entirely unscathed from an encounter with it. Quaker busi-
ness ethics is clearly aligned with MacIntyre’s critique of 
manipulative management, but the decline of Quaker busi-
ness also serves to illustrate that the pressures of 19th and 
early twentieth century capitalism drove business in a direc-
tion that was especially compatible with that approach to 
management. That Quakers often experienced success in 
this realm presents a dilemma—leave business or leave the 
Quakers—is a testament to the strength of the Quaker ethical 
tradition in business and beyond.
Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to provide an account of 
Quaker business ethics in MacIntyrean terms, with the aim 
of enhancing our understanding of both traditions. A com-
prehensive comparison between the two traditions would 
have to confront their dissimilarities. These stem both from 
the differences between Catholic and Quaker theology, as 
well as from MacIntyre’s own hostility to capitalism (see 
Sinnicks 2020b for a discussion in the context of business 
ethics). Nevertheless, Quakerism shares a number of impor-
tant affinities between with MacIntyre’s ethical thought, and 
this connection is especially clear in the domain of busi-
ness ethics. In this paper we have brought attention to three 
areas in which this connection is most visible: commu-
nity, compartmentalisation, and a critique of manipulative 
management.
Sir Adrian Cadbury (foreword, King 2014) disputes 
whether a return to Quaker business ethics is possible in a 
shareholder economy. Our discussion in this paper points to 
some hope. Quakers have a long history of exploring alter-
native ways of organising—the Commonwealth structure of 
Scott Bader deployed originally in 1951 speaks to this—and 
the Quaker emphasis on non-hierarchal forms of organisa-
tion highlight the way in which Quakers see organisation 
and ethical practice as entwined. Renewed interest in the 
B-Corporation movement, common or co-operative owner-
ship and employee ownership are gaining traction, perhaps 
in a way that replicates the Quaker concern of economic 
and social balance. In some ways, Quaker business ethics 
can be understood as having been partially and tacitly inte-
grated into modern capitalism through widespread interest 
in CSR and responsible business even if the Quaker busi-
nesses themselves no longer exist as they once did. However, 
divorced from the deeper ethical commitments of Quaker-
ism, these practices are inherently more liable to depart from 
the sense of community, and the resistance to compartmen-
talization and manipulation that are so important to business 
ethics in the Quaker tradition and the MacIntyrean tradition.
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